This paper estimates the welfare effects for Ethiopian coffee producers from eliminating coffee price volatility. To estimate volatility the GARCH technique is applied to monthly coffee prices in Ethiopia for the period 1976-2012. To distinguish between the unpredictable and predictable components of volatility we obtain separate estimates of the conditional and unconditional variance of the residual. This is combined with estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion to measure the welfare effects from eliminating the unpredictable component of price volatility. A key finding is that the welfare gain from eliminating coffee price volatility is small; the gain per producer comes to a meagre US$ 0.76 in a year. This has important policy implications for the efficacy of price stabilisation mechanisms for coffee producers, i.e. any attempt to eliminate coffee price volatility at a cost may not be a preferred outcome for Ethiopian producers. The contribution of the paper lies in using the unconditional variance as it more truly reflects price risk faced by coffee producers without overestimating it.
Introduction
The impact of market reform programmes on coffee price volatility in Ethiopia was discussed in a paper by Gemech and Struthers (2007) . 1 That study covered the period 1982 to the end of 2001 using monthly data and compared the degree of volatility pre-and post-market reforms. Using the generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) technique, the evidence was clear that the degree of volatility increased dramatically in the post-reform period. In the current paper the extent of price volatility and its increased amplitude after 1992 is evident from a visual inspection of Figure 1 , which reveals striking differences between real coffee price behaviour before the reform period and that after the reform period ). It appears that prices were relatively tranquil before the reforms and became much more volatile after the market reforms were adopted, clearly displaying the phenomenon of volatility clustering.
1 Unless specified otherwise, 'coffee' means green (raw or un-roasted) beans and coffee prices imply prices of green beans. There is no exact definition of price volatility, in general it is an estimate of the range within which prices might vary at a future time. Prices are said to be volatile when the range in which they might fall (rise) at a future date widens. An increase in price volatility therefore implies greater uncertainty about future prices . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Coffee Price Volatility % Change
One of the issues raised but not addressed in the paper by Gemech and Struthers (2007) relates to the welfare implications of the increase in coffee price volatility for Ethiopian coffee producers (hereafter referred to as producers). In this paper we ask the following question:
to what extent would a producer prefer the relative stability of prices of the pre-reform period, albeit with lower average prices, to the higher average prices of the post-reform period, but if those higher average prices are accompanied by greater volatility? This question is of interest for a number of reasons. Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, the issue is essentially an exercise in estimating the welfare effects of commodity price volatility. In the context of this paper, welfare effects refer to the potential cost or benefit from reducing or eliminating uncertainty arising from price volatility.
2 To estimate the welfare effects this paper applies concepts from expected utility theory of relative risk premia and specific risk aversion 2 Price volatility indicates the range within which prices might vary in the future. An increase in price volatility will affect coffee producers as it reduces the accuracy of their forecasts of future prices exposing them to higher levels of price risk. It is difficult to define exactly the price risk exposure of a producer. The most accepted interpretation is the difference in the expected sale price, on the basis of which a producer makes production and marketing decisions, and the actual sale price. How price risk affects producers will vary according to their individual circumstances. In general, it affects their ability to optimise output because the exposure to risk and inability to insure against it may induce them to adopt sub-optimal input usage and engage in low risk activities that result in more stable but lower income. Secondly, the issue is of great importance to the long-standing policy debate as to whether or not stabilisation policies for primary commodity prices are worthwhile. If the welfare gain from eliminating price volatility is negligible, then this begs the question as to whether the benefits derived from price stabilisation interventions are worth the costs of setting up such interventions (such as buffer stocks, marketing boards, production and marketing regulations).
The welfare gains for producers from eliminating coffee price volatility using a framework developed by Lucas (1987; are estimated. The paper also extends the literature on commodity price volatility that typically applies the GARCH econometric technique to measures of coffee price volatility. This is achieved by decomposing the standard measure of volatility, the variance, into two separate measures, the conditional and unconditional variance -where these reflect producers' probabilistic assessments of their predictable and unpredictable price volatilities. It is the unpredictable price volatilities that more truly reflect price risk faced by coffee producers. The results suggest that the welfare gains for producers from eliminating the unpredictable coffee price volatilities are negligible. This has important implications in the policy arena in terms of the efficacy of traditional commodity price stabilisation schemes. Since the welfare gains for producers are very small, any multilateral or unilateral market interventions to reduce price volatility or stabilise coffee prices may not be in the interests of coffee producers. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   Q  u  a  l  i  t  a  t  i  v  e  R  e  s  e  a  r  c  h  i  n  F  i  n  a  n  c  i  a  l  M  a  r  k  e  t  s   5 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the importance of coffee for the Ethiopian economy and the evolution of coffee marketing policies. Section 3 identifies the methodology for estimating the welfare effects for producers from eliminating coffee price volatility. Section 4 estimates the price risk (uncertainty) faced by producers from coffee price volatility. Section 5 estimates the welfare gains for producers from eliminating coffee price volatility; and Section 6 concludes.
Coffee and the Ethiopian economy
Coffee is at the heart of the Ethiopian economy. It is the country's most important export product, accounting for around 32 percent of the value of all merchandise exports and around 16 to 20 percent of the country's total foreign exchange earnings over the years 2011
to 2013 (ICO, 2013 .The land area under coffee cultivation is difficult to determine because plots are fragmented and interspersed with other crops. It is estimated, however, that over the period 2011-13, the area under coffee trees ranged from 450,000 to 500,000 hectares, with annual production ranging from 400,000 to 480,000 tonnes (CSA, 2014; ICO, 2014; FAO, 2014) . Coffee is cultivated by over 4 million, primarily smallholder, farming households.
However, with those employed in ancillary activities to coffee production, even more households depend on coffee for part of their livelihoods. It is estimated that the livelihoods of as many as 15 million (approximately 20 percent of the population) directly or indirectly depend on income from coffee production. (LMC, 2003; Minten et al., 2014) .
Smallholder farmers, most of whom work on less than two hectares of land, grow 95 percent of the coffee while the remaining 5 percent is grown on large coffee farms; the average yield per hectare is estimated to be around 0.72 tonnes (or 720 kg), one of the lowest in Africa (STCP, 2011; Tefera and Tefera, 2013) . Since these farmers are highly dependent on income from coffee production they are vulnerable to negative price shocks arising from domestic economic policy and international coffee and commodity markets. Over the past four decades, coffee marketing in Ethiopia has passed through three phases:
• Until 1974, coffee production and marketing was mostly left to the free market. Although there was a National Coffee Board its role was mainly to oversee the general development of the coffee sector. This was concurrent with the period of the imperial government, which came to an end in 1974.
• • During the post-military regime (after 1991) a free market economic policy was reintroduced by the transitional government. This was facilitated by the suspension of the ICA and general support in favour of economic liberalisation. Private traders were allowed to compete with the ECMC and they soon started handling more than 75 percent 3 According to the regulatory provisions of the ICA, basic export quotas were allocated to each of the exporting countries and they were adjusted according to changes in prices. Export quotas were tightened if international coffee prices fell below a particular level and loosened when they rose above that level. The majority of coffee exports however remains in the hands of the private sector, estimated at around 90 percent in 2012/13 (Minten et al., 2014 Other papers that have tried to measure the welfare effects of commodity price volatility are
Vargas Hill (2010), for the Ugandan coffee market, and Bellemare, Barrrett and Just (2013), using evidence on general price volatility from rural Ethiopia. Using an experimental approach, Vargas Hill (2010) analyses data on farmers' subjective perceptions of price risk after Uganda's coffee market was liberalised in the 1990s. Though perceived price risk in general was found to be significant, it also tended to vary greatly across different households. Such variation in perceived price risk was found to be caused by previous prices received as well as the level to which these prices could go (high or low). Together, these influences had a significant impact on perceptions of price risk.
The welfare implications of these perceptions were calibrated in terms of stylised price insurance contracts, where significant differences in household willingness to pay for such contracts clearly reflected differences in perceived risk between different households. In a similar vein, but this time adopting an expected utility approach, Bellemare, Barrett and Just (2013) set out an analytical framework to develop a willingness to pay index for achieving price stability. This is determined by households' income levels and takes account not only of the variances of single commodities but also the co-variances across several commodtities. Depending on the percentage of income that households are willing to forego to stabilise prices (in this study of seven key food commodities), almost all of the sampled rural Ethiopian households would benefit to some extent. However, the study finds that the richest housohlds tend to benefit most.
In this paper expected utility theory is used as it generates a parameter (CRRA) that can be used in a welfare equation. 8 There is now an extensive literature that applies the concept of CRRA to a number of related scenarios that examine risky behaviour. For example, papers by Moledina, Roe, and Shane (2003), Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) , Hansen (2007), Schechter (2007) and Harrison, Humphrey and Verschoor (2010) apply the concept to; inter alia, betting games with modest and large stakes, lotteries, and a variety of different scenarios related to commodity price volatility. At the heart of these and other similar studies, is the assumption that poor people in developing countries have very high discount rates and are more risk averse than poor people in developed countries. This leads to lower savings rates and low accumulation of capital. An important early study on this aspect is by Binswanger (1980) in which the author carried out experimental estimates of risk aversion through field work in rural India. Attitudes to risk were measured in 240 households using two methods: an interview approach which elicited certainty equivalents and an experimental gambling approach with real substantial payoffs. The findings were that interviewees were subject to interviewer bias and the results were completely different from the experimental measure of risk aversion. The experimental method showed that at high payoff levels, most individuals were moderately risk averse and addtional wealth did not significantly reduce risk the agent is said to be risk loving. The risk-averse agent will choose the certain outcome over an uncertain one with the same expected income; while the risk-loving agent will do the opposite.
A version that combines both types of behaviour is Friedman and Savage's (1948) logistic or sigmoidal curve shown in Fig. 2 . At very low levels of (for the sake of argument, wealth) agents display risk-loving behaviour (in the convex segment of utility curve) and after a particular level they tend to be risk averse (in the concave segment of utility curve).
However, it is possible that after reaching a certain higher level of wealth their behaviour may again change to risk-loving (this can be shown by extending the concave segment of the utility curve in Fig. 2 with a convex segment). This form has been tested in some anthropological studies attempting to gauge the risk attitudes of groups of people in developing countries (Henrich and McElreath, 2002) . In this vein, Kuznar and Frederick (2003) have represented the curve by the following function, which when > >0, is monotonically increasing with respect to : Whatever the shape of the curve, how is it possible to produce a single measure of the degree of risk aversion or risk proneness of agents? The shapes of the curves, the degree of concavity or convexity are clearly of moment in this regard. For example, the more concave the curve, the more quickly it flattens out and thus the more risk averse the agent; and the faster it rises the more risk loving the agent. The problem is that utility functions are not unique. Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) (2) where and are respectively the second and first derivatives of the utility function, > 0 if is monotonically increasing and strictly concave (the case of the risk averse agent), = 0 for the risk neutral agent and < 0 for the risk loving agent.
Risk Loving
Risk Averse (Attitude to risk) A modification to the ARA measure is the relative risk aversion (RRA) equation:
The only difference is that the RRA measure is scaled by the factor . To illustrate, consider the function , where
This displays both ARA and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), shown as follows (5)
So there is absolute risk aversion (ARA) and because = 0, there is also constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). An intuitive explanation for this is that the higher the CRRA the more risk averse is the agent and therefore the more concave the utility curve. The more concave the curve, the higher is the value of relative to hence the higher the values of and . For a concave curve > 0 as the rate of change of the slope of the curve, < 0; for a convex curve Cardenas and Carpenter, 2005) , the standard measure used for risk is the CRRA measure.
This measure assumes that the functional form of the utility functions underlying the attitudes to risk for such people satisfy the condition = 0 and gives the CRRA function as (7) where (Lucas, 1987) and .
Lucas (2003) 
where is N (0, ).
Given these assumptions: 
is a subjective discount rate, is the coefficient of risk aversion, and the expectation is shown in relation to the common distribution of the shocks , etc.
Lucas (2003) postulates that a risk-averse consumer prefers a deterministic (or certain) consumption path to a risky path with the same mean. This utility difference is then quantified by multiplying the risky (or uncertain) path by the constant factor 1+ (in all dates and states); where is chosen in order that the representative household is indifferent between the deterministic path and the compensated, risky path.
In essence, is chosen to solve the following equation:
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For our purposes, we substitute the single consumer by the single producer and we use revenue from coffee sales (income) rather than consumption. It is assumed that producers have zero or negligible savings, therefore consumption is equal to income. 9 The welfare gain therefore is the amount by which the producer would have to be compensated to be indifferent between the risky and deterministic (certain) income streams from coffee sales.
Moledina, Roe and Shane (2003) suggest that the welfare effects of price volatility can be modelled using Lucas's (2003) approach. A risk averse agent (producer in our case) is endowed with a stochastic income stream (from coffee sales), from which consumption takes place. Because he/she is risk averse, the agent prefers the certain income This relates to the notion that rural households in Paraguay face a number of daily risks and the possible loss from losing the bet in the gamble exercise is only one of many risks to consider. When such background risk is included, and saving is impossible, the value of 9 We noted in Section 2 that most coffee producers in Ethiopia are smallholders with low levels of income. They are therefore highly dependent on this income for their living and are not in a position to use the income to build up savings. Binswanger (1980) for rural India. What is also of interest from the Cardenas and Carpenter paper is that measures of from studies of developing countries do not necessarily support the commonly held view that the degree of risk aversion is much higher in developing countries than in developed countries.This tends to contradict the a priori and somewhat intuitive perception that poor people in less developed countries are necessarily and in all circumstances more risk averse than people in developed countries across all income levels and stakes (e.g. in gambles and bets). In terms of the sigmoidal utility function (Figure 2 ), we can see that agents 'crossover' at the point of inflection; therefore it is essential to refer to the stake size before reaching any general predictions about risk preferences. 10 To estimate the welfare gain for producers from eliminating coffee price volatility we can use a value of in the range of 0.6 to 1, a value close to the findings of most of the empirical studies.
With respect to the , and following Moledina, Roe and Shane (2003) 
Measuring price volatility
Previous studies have typically measured commodity price volatility or uncertainty over time using the variance which does not distinguish between conditional and unconditional variances.
11 Implicit in this measurement is the idea that past realisations of prices and volatility have no bearing on current or future realisations. However, it seems reasonable to expect that producers have an implicit knowledge of the conditional distribution of commodity prices and can distinguish regular features in price processes such as seasonal fluctuations and government policy interventions. On the basis of this information, producers generate probabilistic assessments of the predictable and unpredictable price volatilities.
Since the overall variance does not distinguish between these components of the variance of the price series, it can overstate the degree of uncertainty or risk. Following Ramey and Ramey (1995) , Dehn (2000) and Moledina, Roe and Shane (2003) , the variance of the residuals is decomposed into conditional (predictable) and unconditional (unpredictable) to measure coffee price volatility more accurately. The conditional variance has relatively less relevance for measuring price risk as it is predictable by economic agents using past information. On the other hand, the unconditional variance is unpredictable and therefore is 11 The term conditional implies explicit dependence on a past sequence of observations while the term unconditional applies more to long-term behaviour of a time series and assumes no explicit knowledge of past information. 
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To capture coffee price volatility in Ethiopia, the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model proposed by Bollerslev (1986) as an extension of Engle's (1982) ARCH model is used. The proxy for the true measure of coffee price volatility then becomes the unconditional variance obtained from the GARCH ( ) model for the changes in the spot price of coffee. The GARCH methodology is described by the following set of equations.
The conditional variance, h t is given by
Where   in equation (13) is the rate of return (percentage change) in prices,   is the mean of   conditional on past information, Ω  ,  in equation (14) which represents the forecast or deterministic component, of the current return as a function of the information known at time (t -1). This forecast includes: past innovations ,past observations and any other relevant information captured by the explanatory variables X. The information set Ω  ) is complete in the sense that it contains the full history of as well as any out-of-sample information which can be used to predict its value.
On the other hand, the stochastic variable is said to be unpredictable since knowledge of the information contained in Ω  does not improve its prediction.
12 A similar approach is adopted in Gemech, Mohan, Reeves and Struthers (2014) in a study of coffee price volatility in India. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (15) are positive, then shocks to volatility persist over time. The degree of persistence is determined by the magnitude of these parameters.
The unconditional (time independent) variance of the innovations can be written as: (16) To capture all the relevant information contained in   = Ω  , , equation (16) can be rewritten as:
Price volatility is accounted for by the conditional variance ( ) which is specified as a linear function of past squared errors; past values of the conditional variance and a market reform dummy D. The coefficients α i and   are the ARCH and GARCH parameters respectively while p and q are lag lengths for the conditional variance and the squared residuals respectively. Equation (17) is designed to mimic the volatility clustering phenomenon, i.e. large disturbances, positive or negative, become part of the information set used to construct the variance forecast of the next period's disturbance. In this manner, large shocks of either sign are allowed to persist, and can influence the volatility forecasts for several periods. The lag lengths of p and q, as well as the magnitudes of α i and   determine the degree of persistence. A sum lower than unity in equation (16) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
Data
The data consist of 444 observations of monthly coffee producers' prices from January 1976 to December 2012 obtained from the International Coffee Organisation (ICO). The data are in US cents/lb and relate to the average price paid to the grower at the farm gate. Farm gate price is the price received by the producer for a transaction carried out at the first point of sale. The first point of sale occurs at the nearest market to the producer's farm (usually place of production), and therefore is assumed not to include transaction margins (transfer costs) such as transport costs. The Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency (CSA) reports coffee producers' prices on a monthly basis based on regular surveys of producers. The price data include four major Ethiopian coffee types by origin of growing region (Sidama, Harar, Wollega and Jimma) each with a distinct price paid to the producers. The weighted average of all coffee prices is converted from local currency to US cents per pound (at the contemporaneous exchange rate) and supplied to the International Coffee Organisation by the CSA. The nominal prices are converted to real prices using the unit value index of exports of manufactured goods from developed market economies as a deflator (UNCTAD, 2014).
Finally, following its use in the literature (Choi and Kim, 1991; Yang, Haigh and Leatham, 2001 ), the dummy variable D was set equal to one from January 1992 to December 1995;
i.e. when market liberalisation was implemented, and zero otherwise. If D takes a positive sign and is statistically significant, then the market-orientated liberalisation policy can be said to have had an impact in increasing price volatility. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
Results
A formal test was conducted for the null hypothesis to ensure that the price series is a random sequence of Gaussian disturbance (i.e. no ARCH effect). The White (1980) test rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity in equation (13). Since there is clear evidence of heteroskedasticity in the squared residuals, GARCH modelling is appropriate.
The non-stationarity of the levels and first differences for the price series were tested using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The result for a random walk series with a drift (in levels) is equal to -3.5 while for the first difference is -14.8. Based on the relatively large negative value of the ADF statistic (5%, with a critical value for the ADF statistic = -3.4), we conclude that the first difference of the price series is stationary while the level has a unit root. Because GARCH modelling assumes a rate of return, we used the first difference of the logarithm of the price series which is equivalent to the monthly returns (i.e.   =   -  ).
The GARCH (1,1) estimates for price variability summarised in Table 1 are the correct sign and are all statistically significant at the 5% level. (Higher order lag structures for 'p' and 'q' in equation (17) were tried but only the GARCH (1,1) estimates were statistically significant.
The coefficient of the GARCH effect (0.517) is larger than the coefficient of the ARCH effect (0.143), implying that large market surprises induce relatively small revisions in future volatility. The sum of the estimated coefficients is equal to 0.66, which satisfies the stationary boundary constraints, i.e.   +   < 1. The Wald statistic for testing the restriction is 21.0 compared to the 5% critical value of 3.84. Thus, the hypothesis that the GARCH model is integrated is strongly rejected. Also, the coefficient of the reform dummy has the expected sign and is statistically significant, broadly supporting the hypothesis that there was an increase in producers' price volatility following the period of market reforms. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Our measure of the conditional volatility obtained from the fitted values of in equation (17) is 0.002 while the estimated value of the unconditional variance, ℎ obtained from equation (16) is 0.01.
Welfare gains from eliminating price volatility
To estimate the welfare gain from eliminating coffee price volatility, estimates of the overall variance, the conditional variance and the unconditional variance and the selected values of are combined to produce the welfare gains of eliminating coffee price volatility shown in The magnitude of the potential gain from eliminating price uncertainty when we use a combination of = 0.6 and the unconditional annualised variance of 0.03464 gives us 0.01039, or 1.039 percent of revenue (income) from coffee. 13 We choose the value 0.6 and the unconditional variance to compute the welfare gain because it reflects the lower bound and rules out any over estimation of welfare gains.
We can obtain an estimate of the revenue from coffee production by multiplying the hectarage under coffee cultivation in Ethiopia with average yield in kg per hectare and the mean price of coffee per kg. If we take crop year 2012, the hectarage was around 450,000, average yield around 720kg per hectare, and average price received by the producer was 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (ICO, 2014) . This gives a total revenue to coffee producers of US$291 million, giving a welfare gain to producers of a little over US$3.03 million (i.e. 0.01039 multiplied by 291) or US$6.73 per hectare. We noted in Section 2 that Ethiopia has 4 million producers, most with a very small holding. The gain per producer comes to a meagre US$ 0.76 (for crop year 2012). We can therefore say that under the assumptions made the welfare gain from eliminating coffee price volatility per producer and per hectare is negligible.
Conclusions and policy implications
This paper had a very specific purpose; namely to assess the possible welfare gain from eliminating the price risk from coffee price volatility faced by Ethiopian coffee producers. To estimate the price risk faced by producers, we de-couple the GARCH estimates of volatility into conditional (predicted) variance and the unconditional (unpredicted) variance. As the unconditional variance more truly reflects price risk, we apply these estimates to the relevant aspects of expected utility theory (specifically the CRRA concept drawn from Lucas' (2003) framework) to arrive at estimates of welfare gain to producers from eliminating this risk.
What is evident from these estimates is the very small welfare cost to producers of the high level of price volatility. What are the implications of this finding to producers faced with such price volatility? Does it suggest that price volatility is a feature of their livelihoods that they have to accept as the least bad outcome when the alternative of eliminating or reducing price volatility does not offer much gain. Furthermore, lower price volatility usually comes with a cost so it may not be a desirable outcome for producers. In the absence of detailed empirical (field) work, this paper simply suggests that any attempt to eliminate coffee price volatility at a cost may not be a preferred outcome for Ethiopian producers.
The paper also raises the issue of whether economic agents in developing countries (in this case, coffee producers) are a priori more risk averse than their counterparts in developed countries. On this issue there is ongoing debate, much of which is derived from the developing countries may be more risk averse than those in developed countries, along with the high vulnerability of producers to coffee price volatility due to their high dependency on income from coffee for their livelihoods, governments often acquiesce in the creation of marketing boards and other forms of market interventions to mitigate price volatility.
Historically such interventions also included the ICAs. Although the objective is to improve the welfare of producers, the outcome may not be in their best interest, more so as these interventions often have high implementation, monitoring and other regulatory costs. This paper casts doubt on the desirability of such schemes as the welfare gains to producers are very low or negligible.
A note of caution may be in order. Our result casts doubt on market interventions to stabilise prices. However, it may be desirable to develop mechanisms that allow producers (and other economic agents involved in the coffee supply chain in coffee producing countries) access to price risk management derivative instruments such as coffee futures and options. Although the use of these instruments also comes at a cost, these costs are known up-front to the producers and it is optional for them to use them depending on whether they wish to internalise the cost. Gemech, Mohan, Reeves and Struthers' (2011) study supports positive payoffs for producers from the use of such instruments, especially if producers themselves are able to allocate resources more efficiently in the production of coffee and improve their ability to access credit. On a practical level, there may be barriers to producers in accessing these instruments in terms of minimum size of contract, low liquidity, counterparty risk and basis risk. The challenge is to evolve an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework that would allow coffee producers in countries such as Ethiopia an easy and reliable mechanism to manage their price-risk according to their individual circumstances, even if 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 producers via an online real-time pricing system supported by an efficient warehouse receipt system and speedy payments into farmers' bank accounts. Such a market-based system, designed to reduce counterparty risk, is perhaps the way forward for coffee producing countries such as Ethiopia, as opposed to the previous forms of government intervention described earlier in this paper, such as marketing boards and ICAs. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
